The Problem
The planning of defence of military targets and infrastructure against attack from land, sea and air is a long and complex operation. Considerations need to take into account attacks against aircraft from MANPADS, stand-off weapons such as direct and indirect fire weapons, improvised explosives (IEDs) and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).
The Military security forces still use traditional and laborious methodology, – ‘walking the ground’ – to carry out vulnerability assessments. By operating in this way, they are unaware that the use of detailed geographic analysis considerably reduces survey areas, saving time and resources.
In addition, simply defending buildings using surveillance technology isn’t fool-proof either. How about what the sensors see, and more importantly, what can they not? If a sensor goes down, which one needs to be tasked to ensure surveillance coverage is maintained?
When there is an attack you need to get a team in there to neutralise them. They can see everything so how do you get your team in? What are the safe routes in and out?
